













A New Era of Party Politics in a Globalised 


















QoG WORKING PAPER SERIES 2008:20=
=
THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
Box 711 












© 2008 by Marie Demker. All rights reserved. A version of this paper was published in Gloppen, Siri amd Lise 
Rakner (eds.) Globalization and Democratization: Challenges for Political Parties. Berge: Fagbokforlaget. 
A New Era of Party Politics in a Globalised World.  
The Concept of Virtue Parties 
Marie Demker 






Department of Political Science,  
University of Gothenburg 
Box 711  
SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden 
marie.demker@pol.gu.se    
Introduction 
Today, democratisation and transition to democratic government is features that 
characterise international politics. The process is taking place both in an 
incremental way where old democracies adapt to new procedures and in a more 
profound way where new states choose their democratic style of government. 
Political parties are still unavoidable agents in this process, by mobilising, 
aggregating, articulating and also taking place in parliament and government.  
 
The kind of democratic models that are proposed and implemented are usually 
the market-oriented, individualistic and justice-oriented models that are frequent 
in Western Europe and also are at hand at the North American continent. In line 
with this also the struggle for freedom rights, legal justice and a defence of 
individual human rights has gone global. In new democracies these features has 
been especially prominent. Align with this, political parties over the world has 
taken up the challenge of promoting good governance, in terms of impartiality, 
equality, liberal rights, deregulating markets and anti-corruption policies. In both 
new democracies as the eastern European countries and in old democracies in 
Asia this issues have been visible features in election campaigns. 
 
Here I will discuss investigate new parties that have been founded on a virtue 
basis, which means an ideological platform where a kind of political 
perfectionism is the main element. The concept of political perfectionism I a 
useful concept understanding the development of new parties founded on virtue 
basis. Michael Keren (2000) has divided political parties in three broad 
categories – those who advocate pragmatic solutions to satisfy their social 
groups, those who pursue profound societal reforms mainly in the environmental 
spheres (so called new politics) and those who are rooted in an imagined rather a 
real society. The last category is compound of parties that try to attempt human 
virtues; they are parties with more or less utopian goals. An example is the 
Swedish Pirate Party, which argue that all copyright should be banned and free 
down-loading of music and films allowed, another is pure religious parties with a 
religious state on their agenda. The globalised political agenda of today is much 
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more occupied with issues of virtue than before, not to say that issues of material 
goods are uninteresting. 
 
This changing political and economic agenda should be seen as a consequence of 
both democratization and globalization. Through norms about democracy and 
wider communication between groups beyond national borders, the urge for 
“clean politics” or “political perfectionism” has grown stronger. Today corruption 
in the literature tend to be seen as a matter of state-corruption (ref) but the 
discussion on how clientilism, economic crimes, mafia and a wide range of bribes 
to brokers of all kinds middle-hands has influences national politics is much 
older.  These processes were both an effect of older networks, based on family, 
inheritance, region or party, and in itself it also reproduced such networks. In an 
individualized world, where democracy is based on the idea of one man-one vote 
these networks are now challenged.  
 
In a globalised world individualisation and destabilisation seems to be the two 
most central traits in both politics and society, internationally as well as within 
individual nation states. Internationally, individualisation manifests itself as an 
ever stronger position of human rights, at the expense of state sovereignty. 
Nationally, individualisation means, e.g., an increased importance of the specific 
competencies of the individual on the labour market and a decreasing interest in 
collective political activities. 
 
Internationally, destabilisation manifests itself as a loosening up of the 
sovereignty of the nation state, increased importance of different types of 
transnational networks and a weakened position of the state sovereignty-based 
international law. Nationally, individualisation means a loosening up of the class 
structures of the industrial society and of the traditional professional roles and 
cleavages that came with the national and industrial revolutions (Bjereld & 
Demker 2006).  
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In this fragile and insecure world, where content, substance and truth are matters 
of subjectivity, citizens tend to turn to political institutions that guarantee 
predictability, transparency and impartiality. At least, they think, these qualities 
will give some stability and will be risk reducers in a destabilised and 
individualised society. This could, for voters and citizens, turn out to be the 
seeking of the perfectionist government and the perfect policy. And who could 
make this happen? Maybe political parties that promise to wash out corruption, 
clientilism, establishment ties and “old boys’ network”. 
 
In old and new democracies the qualifications and conditions for parties to evolve 
and reproduce ideological dimensions differs radically. Old democracies have a 
party system where new parties have to fit in the competitions that characterise 
exactly this system. Success in elections is not enough. In new democracies new 
parties has a major chance of being the dominant party or at least the pole of the 
dominant party, just on the grounds of success in elections. Party systems in 
newer democracies also change more profoundly over time than democracies 
with parties that were initiated in the late 1800. 
 
 
Virtue parties and party theory 
The first mission to complete is therefore a conceptualization of virtue parties. 
Virtue parties are parties that are founded on a platform of perfectionist politics, 
and which main goal is to promote impartiality, freedom rights, transparency, 
anti-corruption and break old clientilistic structures. This type or category of 
parties has not been treated as a distinct ideological group.  
 
In their seminal article Katz and Mair’s discuss the concept “cartel parties”, which 
are parties depending on state subsidies and power positions, often associated 
with each other (Katz & Mair 1995). Virtue parties could instead be seen as the 
opposite to cartel parties, rather a sub-group of anti-establishment parties (Abedi 
2004) because of their explicit dissociation from the state. Normally anti-
establishment parties are populist parties and quite often also right-wing. But the 
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parties which promote perfectionist policy are rarely populist or right-wing, 
rather liberal and market-oriented. First and foremost these parties have to be 
theoretically conceptualized.  
 
For party theory the most urgent question is how virtue parties affect party 
systems. Which consequences do virtue parties have promoting cleavages about 
just processes rather than cleavages about ideological substance? I argue that a 
global change of politics that put security, safety, risk and trust first and foremost 
has taken place. Could it then be said that old cleavages (as left-right) have been 
overthrown by new ones? Or is it instead so that old cleavages still structures new 
policy issues by challenging old parties to engage in new issues? These empirical 
questions will not be answered in this text, but they are challenge me to try to 
conceptualize the virtue party as a first step in such an investigation. 
 
Party theory and theories about party systems has several seminal works, nearly 
all of them from the 1950s or 1960s. Maurice Duverger gave in his book “Parties 
politiques” from 1951 a taxonomy but also implications of causal links between 
party organisation and ideological substance. He also foresaw that the mass party 
organisation would be the usual type of party, something that was right but has 
since then developed one step further. In his argument he mention the so called 
contagion from the left, by which he meant that the moderate left parties had an 
organisation that would be attractive to more conservative parties. Otto 
Kirchheimer gave us in 1966 the concept of “catch-all-parties” which meant 
parties that has reduced the ideological baggage to a minimum and by that tried 
to reach out to nearly every voter. In these parties the mass party has 
transformed to a party organisation which also has left behind deep ideological 
cleavages, something that reduces the members to election-workers more than 
mobilised citizens. Richard Katz and Peter Mair has contributed to this 
organisational research tradition in many ways, and their concept “cartel party” 
which they introduced in the very first number of the journal “Party Politics” in 
1995 has been a widely used one. The cartel party is the party that is so 
intertwined with institutional power that the member organisation has been 
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reduced and the party instead relies on state subsidies and positions in 
administration. 
 
Party systems literature begins virtually with Seymour Martin Lipset’s and Stein 
Rokkan’s contributions about social cleavages from 1967.  Putted in a quite 
simple way they pointed out two remarkable processes – the national revolution 
and the industrial revolution – that has shaped the party systems in Europe. 
These two processes produced cleavages between church and state and between 
centre and periphery (national revolution) and cleavages between agrarian and 
commercial way of producing and between workers and owners (industrial 
revolution). Because the cleavages precipitated democracy they also came to 
shape the party systems. Being the ground for political dimensions (as the left-
right-dimension) these cleavages has reproduced themselves until our days. The 
dimension still most important is the left-right-dimension. 
 
Discussing competition in the party systems both Anthony Downs in (1957) and 
Giovanni Sartori in (1976) has been epoch-making. Downs pointed out, in a 
rational choice perspective, that competition in a multiparty-systems and a two-
party-systems differed in theoretical ways. He also argued that opinion was the 
main force in shaping party systems (and should also be so). Sartori discussed 
how and when party systems became fragmented and put effort on which kind of 
competition that took place in the party systems. Before him most researchers 
has treated the party system as a matter of numbers, but after Sartori they 
discussed the mechanisms for competition between parties. 
 
In later works political scientist now emphasise that issues and policy proposals 
are more determinant for political dimensions that are social cleavages. In the 
Manifesto research Group (led by Ian Budge) the relation between party ideology 
and policy issues has been investigated. As David Robertson showed in (1976) 
parties are sharply restricted by their ideology. On the other hand research has 
shown that issue dimensions tend to be more salient and more spread over 
nation boundaries than are ideological dimensions (Warwick 2005). Although 
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the theory of issue voting, or voting according to saliency, has been sharply 
contested by the directional hypothesis no-one deny that political parties has 
been more issue directed. The directional hypothesis is more interested in the 
voters choice among ideological packages, where special issues and pregnant 
policy positions could be of help for the voter. (Narud & Valen 2007) 
 
In their pregnant and analytical article “Cleavages, issues and parties: a critical 
overview of the literature” Josep Colomer and Riccardo Puglisi draw our 
attention to a point in Lipset’s and Rokkan’s work that maybe could be a 
theoretical bridge builder between the social cleavage-model and the issue-model 
(Colomer and Puglisi 2005). Colomer and Puglisi cite Lipset and Rokkan when 
they stated that we should “consider the possibility that the parties themselves 
might establish themselves as significant poles of attraction and produce their 
own alignments independently of the geographical, the social and the cultural 
underpinning of the movements” (p 503f). What this say is that parties reproduce 
themselves, if and when they have come to the position that they mobilised a 
cleavage and transformed into a pole on an ideological dimension. 
 
It seems as we could hypothesise that the lesser importance of social cleavages for 
party politics the more interest for parties to mobilise voters on the ground of 
issues. But ideological baggage tends also to be reduced when the old cleavages 
decrease in importance. In a world where safety and security is put first and 
where politics is seen as a kind of insurance system securing our individual life 
styles freedom rights as impartiality, transparency, anti-discrimination, anti-
corruption, judicial issues and immaterial rights has been political issues that are 
more and more prominent in political life. 
 
 
Conceptualizing the virtue party 
In the party literature the notion of party families are a core element. In an 
evaluation of this concept Peter Mair and Cas Mudde (1998) concluded that the 
most adequate way of categorizing parties understanding what they are rather 
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than what they do, are connected to the parties origin and their ideology. Party 
families or “familles spirituelles” are the most common ground of comparing 
parties over national boundaries. In their work Jean Louis Seiler (1980) and 
Klaus von Beyme (1985) categorized parties on the ground of Stein Rokkan’s 
model of European political cleavages.   
 
During the years more families have been included and the last family to be 
included is perhaps the right wing populist parties. Over the years there have also 
been harder to distinguish between the party families because they seek to find 
their voters in new marketplaces. Parties in a modern media-centred multi-party 
system are maybe more governed by vote-maximizing than by policy outputs in 
the parliamentary arena and internal cohesion. (Sjöblom 1968) But in their 
evaluation Mair and Mudde argues that origin, which tracks its roots from 
Rokkan’s cleavages, and ideology, which tracks its roots from David Robertson 
and Ian Budge’s Manifesto project. Mair and Mudde argues that the genetic 
origin of the parties is a relevant comparative ground for diachronic comparison 
(long time study) between party families, while an ideological categorization is a 
relevant comparative ground for a more synchronic analysis where variations 
over national could be explained. Here they must be interpreted as opposing the 
literature that propose an analysis concentrating on parties in terms of their 
timing, as for example “new parties” and “old parties”. (Lucardie 2000) 
 
During the last decade it has been a matter of dispute to what extent populist 
parties forms a family or not. Populism is notoriously hard to define, although 
there have been several good attempts (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, Widfeldt & 
Rydgren 200X, Betz 1994). The minor common element is seeking to win the 
support of voters by treating the nation as a homogenous group, the people, 
where social divides and controversies are of minor political importance. 
Populism is a communication style where the party is calling for specified policy 
lines on the grounds of a uniting history and a common cultural heritage. 
Populism is, almost always, a form of anti-establishment movement where the 
cleavage between ordinary people and governing elites is emphasised. The 
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combination of anti-establishment ideas and a populist rhetoric often results in a 
right-wing or nationalist ideology. (Eatwell & Mudde 2004) But in recent year’s 
new parties has emerged, and have successes, especially in eastern and central 
Europe that are both anti-establishment and populist, but not could be treated as 
populist or nationalist right-wing parties. (Bågenholm & Johansson 2005) 
 
In an overview, Peter Ucen has described these parties as directed against all 
previous configurations of the ruling elite, and they blame the entire 
establishment for misrepresentation, immoral conduct and poor governance. 
Instead they offer increasing living standards, safeguarding western orientation 
and fighting corruption. (Ucen 2007) These parties often disappear after one or 
two elections, but some of them has had great success and/or transformed to 
established parties. Ucen argues that there are two kinds of populist, anti-
establishment parties in the eastern and central Europe: nationalist right-wing 
parties and centrist, pure populist parties. 
 
In Western Europe though, no distinctions between two kinds of populist anti-
establishment parties has been done in later years. It is noticeable since several 
west European countries saw anti-tax-parties born in the 1970s. These parties 
where populist and anti-establishment as were the new parties in east and central 
Europe, but they where not right-wing or nationalistic parties. Some of them – in 
Norway and Denmark – went over in new forms where they developed an anti-
immigrant ideological platform. In recent years we can see a new wave of anti-
establishment, more or less populist, parties in western Europe that advocates 
and defend the right of free speech and communication, deliberative democracy 
and civic rights. In Sweden Piratpartiet is one of them, in France Mouvement 
Democrate is another. And the Pim Fortuyn list in the Netherlands was, before it 
went anti-immigrant on the right-wing, more or less a centrist populist party.  
 
Earlier studies has shown that it is possible to divide the populist voters between 
protest voters and ideological voters. (van der Brug & Fennema 2003) And, more, 
European investigations show that anti-immigrant parties gain successes mainly 
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through their ideological direction, not as a party for a marginalized socio-
economic category. A study of thirteen European anti-immigrant parties over ten 
years implicates that a group of socioeconomic marginalized citizens is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for the success of right-wing parties. (van 
der Brug, Fennema & Tillie 2005) In order to explain party system change, party 
strategy, voting behaviour and policy outcome it should therefore, reasonably, 
not be un-important to make a distinction between populist, anti-establishment 
parties with a nationalist, right-wing ideology and populist, anti-establishment 




A new party family? Cleavages and ideology 
Following Mair and Mudde the family of virtue parties should be defined from 
the parties origin in socio-economic cleavages and from their ideological stance. 
Political cleavages are formed gradually and through conflict. In political 
sociology, the seminal work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan entitled 
“Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments” from 1967 continues to 
dominate the discussion on political cleavages. (Mair 1990)  
 
Lipset and Rokkan identified four primary cleavages emerging from the national 
and industrial revolutions. When nation-states were formed, conflicts emerged 
between the central elite and local opposition (center-periphery conflict) and 
between the religious and secular authorities (church-state conflict). When the 
industrial revolution spread throughout Western Europe, conflicts arose between 
those engaged in the primary form of production – agriculture – and those who 
relied on the secondary industry (rural-urban conflict), as well as between those 
who owned the means of production in industry and those who owned only their 
labor (capital-labor conflict). From these four conflicts, Western Europe has 




In most countries, the strongest cleavage has been the class-based left-right 
distinction, but many countries have and have had crossing cleavages. Political 
parties normally express some of these cleavages and are forced to adapt 
themselves to the dominant cleavages in the country. 
 
There is a controversy about how to define the concept ’cleavage’ so that it 
promotes an understanding of societal conflicts. Douglas W Rae and Michael 
Taylor, both political scientists, argue that there three different types of 
cleavages. (Rae & Taylor 1970) The ascriptive or trait cleavages regard different 
decided categories that are possible to belong or not belong to, based on for 
example sex (man-woman), religion (catholic-protestant), ethnicity (hutu-tutsi) 
or class (capitalist-worker). The attitudinal or opinion cleavages regard 
differences between individuals or groups in a society. The behavioural or art 
cleavages regard different forms of behaviour or acting as for example voting or 
membership in organizations.  
 
But Rae and Taylor’s classification has met strong objections, most distinctly 
formulated by the two political scientists Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair. 
Bartolini and Mair emphasize that every political relevant cleavage has a socio-
economic base and that Rae and Taylor’s three cleavages actually are three 
aspects of one and only cleavage. (Bartolini & Mair 1990) In addition, Bartolini 
and Mair argue that every cleavage has three levels: an empirical element, which 
can be defined in socio-economic terms (e.g. social class), a normative element, 
regarding a collective identity (e.g. the feeling of belonging to a social class) and 
an organizational/behavioural element, (e.g. class based parties or labour 
market organizations) regarding the growth of parties and organizations on the 
ground of a collective identity. 
  
Here I address, by using the concept ‘cleavage’, the pattern of conflicts between 
groups of people. These patterns should have a social base and also have had 
taken the form of value differences and some kind of behaviour, like organizing a 
party, interest group or social movement, or political protests as demonstrations 
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or campaigns, and other ways of promoting one’s interests. A cleavage therefore 
demands some kind of conflict of interest or perceived conflict of interest, with 
base in social conditions.  
 
The national revolution and industrial revolution – using Lipset’s and Rokkan’s 
concepts – had profound consequences for how European and western 
democracies developed. I argue – maybe not too surprisingly - that the 
communicational revolution is the third step in this democratic development, 
and it will have as profound consequences as the earlier two steps. The 
communication revolution has – through the development of transportation and 
information technology – changed the meaning of territory in relation to power 
and identity. The changed significance of territory, in our view, constitutes the 
most central element of the globalization process.(Held & McGrew 1999) The 
changed significance of territory drains the power base of the nation state, which 
is based on sovereignty over a limited territory. At the same time, non-state 
actors play an ever-increasing role in international politics.  
 
Through individualization and destabilization a potentional political cleavage, 
following the communicational revolution, between transnational networks and 
national states is established. Transnational networks promote universal rights, 
liberal democracy, freedom of speech and a universal ethics in politics. National 
states on the other side defend themselves from external pressure, exercise their 
sovereignity and demand attachment to a common national history and culture. 
This cleavage can be transformed into a national partysystem where new parties 
advocate international norms of what I earlier called perfectionist policies while 
other new parties make efforts to defend the country from these norms. As 
mentioned above a cleavage must have a social base, a value divergence and 
effects on behaviour. These are empirical questions which I will not answer here, 
but they will be adressed in the continuing work. Virtue parties then have their 
origin in the new global cleavage of international network vs national states. 
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What then about ideology? Party ideology is both used to gain support and to 
genuinly define the party. (Demker 1997) As an element of the party’s identty 
ideology is also a restriction on behaviour. (Robertson 1976) Party ideology is 
often analysed as programmatic standpoints, election platforms or media 
rhetoric. (Budge & Farlie 1983, Jagers & Walgrave 2007) But ideology could also 
be treated as a two-level organized world of ideas. On the surface the party hold 
some signifying standpoints which is targeted to the main group of voters and 
possible to change on elections bases. On a more fundamental level the party 
have some principled beliefs and world views that are not open to fast change. 
(Demker 1993) 
 
Virtue parties advocates all kind of liberal freedoms, civic rights and individual 
rights. Their ideological stance is centrist, but derives from the human rights 
discourse which have been massivley influential since the turn down of the Berlin 
wall. They are genuinly anti-establishment as they critizise the ruling elite of 
authoritarianism, corruption or other misuses of power. These parties are also 
genuinly populist as they adress ordinary people to join a kind of social 
movement regardless of class, sex or ethnicity. They also use a communcation 
style where they direct themselves to all voters and treat all citizens as a 
homogenous group regarding how the proposed policies would affect the life of 
the voters. They differ from catch-all parties because they have an ideological 
baggage, though adapted to broad layers in the society. 
  
The virtue party holds liberal rights and individual freedom as key principles in 
their fundamental ideology. Norms of universal ethics as equality, impartiality, 
freedom of speech and thought as well as individual rights to exercise your way of 
life is in the heart of the virtue party’s fundamental principles.  On the standpoint 
level they usually advocates more transparency, claims of responsibility from 
establishment, a defence for individual integrity, implementation of anti-




Virtue parties then differ from populist right-wing parties in all ideological 
aspects. At the same time there is also resemblance. Both party families could be 
seen as originating from the same cleavage, and they also is very well adapted to a 
society where fast and wide communications is implemented through internet, 
web logs and chat sites. It has been put in question if the European populist 
right-wing parties could be explained through the traditional socio-economic 
model, where primarily the demand side of politics is focused. The answer has 
hitherto been no. (van der Brug, Fennema, Tillie 2005) Maybe it is a more fruitful 
attempt to explain both virtue parties and right-wing parties as originating from 
the new political cleavage between on one hand the spread of norms through 
transnational networks and on the other the defence of the nation state? 
 
 
Virtue parties in the real world: some examples 
Mair and Mudde suggest (1998) suggests that party families should be compared 
by their origins and by their ideology. This approach is concerned with what 
parties are rather than what they do. In a long-term study ideology I crucial, but 
in an study like this the party’s origin would be the most essential. Virtue parties 
all are mobilised along the same side of the same cleavage (transnational 
networks and nation state) while on the other side of this cleavage we have right-
wing nationalist parties which defend the nation state. 
 
In Europe I have found at least three real examples of what I call virtue parties 
and these are Res Publica Party in Estonia, The Other Russia in Russia, 
Piratpartiet (The Pirate Party) in Sweden and Mouvement Démocrate 
(Democratic movement) in France. 
 
Res Publica was founded in December 2001 but was preceded by a political club 
by young politically engaged Estonians. The club was formed already in 1989. In 
June 2006 Res Publica and the other conservative party Pro Patria were united in 
a common party. After the 2007 elections this united party got 18 percent of the 
votes. This result was a disappointment though the parties have had over 30 
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percent of the votes in the election of 2003.  Despite this electoral loss the united 
Res Publica and Pro Patria party joined the Estonian government in April 2007. 
 
Res Publica Party then had its heydays from 2002 until 2006. The party’s origin 
lies in the transitions from the Soviet system. Professor Rein Taagepera – who is 
both a natural scientist and a political scientist – has written about how he came 
to accept to be a leader of the new Res Publica party.  He writes that the context 
for the rise of the Res Publica Party was “openness in intra-party dealings and 
finances” and “a code of political ethics”. (Taagepera 2005) Res Publica Party was 
founded, according to Taagepera, as a response to disillusions, corruption and 
lack of interpersonal trust, all explained by the long Soviet repression.  
 
As a party Res Publica was founded outside the parliament by a group of 
politically engaged young citizens. The party came out of a political club for 
discussions and seems not to be connected directly to other political 
organisations during the initial stage. Res Publica built up an extensive 
membership base and tried to develop an internal democracy that was not seen 
before in Estonia. But the party was also strongly dependent on the financial 
support from private contributions that gave way for extensive campaigning. 
(Sikk 2004) 
 
After the first experience in parliament and government the party joined another 
more conservative party and is still in government. The first coalition 
government, led by Res Publica, broke down after less than two years (in March 
2005) because of too strong opposition against Res Publica’s policy on anti-
corruption. The interior minister Ken-Marti Vaher got a confidence voting 
against him in the parliament (54/101) and Prime Minister Juhan Parts decided 
to step down. 
 
The main purpose of the party was to change the political culture and the political 
practice of Estonia. And new politics is here to be interpreted as ethics, anti-
corruption and trust between leaders and citizens. Ideologically the party was 
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mainly, as the name hints, occupied with the general interest. The party wanted 
to be a political “purifier”. (Taagepera 2005) Res Publica had an ideological base 
of bridging between extremists, avoiding personal financial interests in politics 
and promoting expert knowledge. In the new party programme from 2006 for the 
united party Res Publica-ideology is traced in issues as emphasis on long-term 
analysis of political effects, protection of citizens and property from the 
arbitrariness of state and state officials, transparency, efficiency and 
implementation of clearly defined goals in economic matters. 
 
Res Publica than had its origin outside parliament, in a group of young engaged 
citizens arguing for a new ethics in politics after the Soviet repression. The 
ideology of the party puts forward issues of personal freedom and responsibility, 
transparency and anti-corruption but also efficiency and justice. 
 
The other Russia is an umbrella coalition and is something in-between a party 
and a social movement. (http://www.theotherrussia.ru/eng/)  They are although 
convinced that they will put up candidates in the next presidential election in 
2008. The other Russia has some visible leaders as former check world champion 
Gary Kasparov. Kasparov is a leader of an organisation called “United Civil 
Front”, founded in 2005 and one of the main organisations in the umbrella 
coalition. Other organisations under this umbrella are “Centre for the 
development of democracy and human rights”, “Moscow Helsinki Group” and 
Republican party of Russia”. The umbrella organisation The Other Russia was 
founded in 2006, originally during the G8-meeting in Moscow. Several western 
diplomats were attending the inaugural conference. In 2006 and 2007 The Other 
Russia has managed to perform a number of protest marches under the name of 
“March of the Discontented”. 
 
Kasparov tries to rally groups which are opposing president Vladimir Putin with 
democratic means. They all oppose the financial funds from business oligarchs 
that 1996 helped Boris Jeltsin to win over the popular communist candidate 
Gennadij Zyuganov. In this election they argue that Russia sold out its 
 15
democratic future in fear of extremism. Instead, says Kasparov, democracy is 
about upholding regulations and having a legitimate transfer of power. (Time  
March 29, 2007) 
 
In their closing statement from July 2006 The Other Russia states that the aim to 
“restore civil control” of power in Russia and that citizens should be protected 
from “the dangerous impulses of the representatives of power”. The statement 
also emphasise accountability, responsibility and free information. In an 
interview with internet site Al-Jazeera in April 2007 Kasparov says that The 
Other Russia wants to take Russia out of the hands of “the corrupted 
bureaucracy”. (Al-Jazeera 2007) This process includes free and fair elections, 
control of corruption and no censorship. The issue of a free press, free television 
and unbiased information is one of the most profiled issues of The Other Russia. 
 
The marches performed by The Other Russia has nearly always been neutralised 
by police and army forces. In April 2007 two marches in Moscow and St 
Petersburg were heavily destroyed and Kasparov himself was arrested for a short 
time. Politically they have not achieved any gains yet, but they have had much 
attention in foreign press. Through this attention the marches has been more and 
more successful and they have also been supported by round tables and 
discussions. 
 
The origin of The Other Russia is outside parliament, through a forum for 
discussions between several groups for protecting democracy and human rights 
in Russia. The foundation was also more or less supervised by western diplomats 
from the US and Great Britain. Choosing a time when the G8 were resembled in 
Moscow also hints that The Other Russia promotes internationally held norms 
about transparency, democracy and the rule of law. 
 
The ideology is somewhat more difficult to define because we have here an 
umbrella coalition. But the minor common denominator is liberal freedoms. In 
many meetings and marches not only democracy but especially the freedom of 
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information and speech are prominent features. Kasparov himself accuse the 
Putin-regime of corruption and non-democratic rule, and The Other Russia itself 
is very careful in distancing itself from populist and anti-democratic means of 
overthrowing the regime.  
 
The Pirate Party in Sweden was founded in Christmas time 2005 through an 
internet site where everybody could protest against criminalizing downloading 
copyright-protected material from the Internet. The party was formerly 
registered at the Swedish Electoral Authority (Valmyndigheten) in February, 
2006. During the electoral campaign before the 2006 election in Sweden the 
party got nearly 10 000 members but afterwards the membership has went down 
to 5 900 members. In the election the Pirate Party only got 0,63 percent or 
34 918 votes, but the party is still very active. (http://www.piratpartiet.se)  
 
The party came out of an organisation called “The Pirate Bureau” and founded in 
2003 which has taken seriously the task of defending the rights of all 
downloader’s.  Through the internet-site The Pirate Bay hundreds of copyright-
protected commodities (films, music and software) were shared by users all over 
the world. This organisation argued for a revised copyright-jurisdiction and for 
sharing information, music, films and other cultural artefacts on the Internet. 
The Pirate Party has its origin among a group of mostly young men with liberal 
political views where issues on personal integrity and individual freedom are 
prominent. They do not favour either right or left in the choice between the two 
block, but wishes to join the coalition that can give the most influence to issues 
on personal integrity. 
 
The Pirate Party has its origin outside parliament and none of the founders had 
any parliamentary experiences before. The party is the only one of the discussed 
which was initiated on the Internet. But both The Other Russia and the French 
Democratic Movement wishes to use internet as a channel for mobilising support, 
spreading information and gathering ideas from members and supporters. The 
Pirate Party was more or less an initiative from the founding father Mr Richard 
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Falkvinge, but in 2007 the party has several district sections and a growing cadre 
of leaders around the country.  
 
In the spring 2007 the party decided to put up a youth organisation “Young 
Pirates” as a consequence of the remarkably success in the Swedish school 
elections in 2006 (a kind of test elections for students) when the Pirate Party had 
about 40 percent of the votes in some schools. The Pirate Party is not as an urban 
phenomenon as could be expected. Instead they seem to have more members in 
provincial towns around Sweden as Tidaholm and Markaryd, but also small 
university cities as Lund and Uppsala.  
 
The ideology of the Pirate Party can be concluded in three principles; that 
personal integrity should be protected, that products of culture as books, films, 
theatre and so on must be free for sharing and that patent and private monopoly 
are harmful for society. (http://www.piratpartiet.se/principer) As a consequence 
the Pirate Party safeguards the private life of every citizen, leading to opposition 
to most forms of surveillance and control of both electronic communication and 
other communications. The Pirate Party is also favouring that the so called 
immaterial rights should be abandoned so that all kinds of copyright is reduced 
both in time and scope. In the extension of this argument the Pirate Party is also 
against private patent for example in the medical industry and all kind of private 
monopoly and oligopoly. Patent and monopoly harm the free market, according 
to the party, and the state controlled sector should counteract private monopoly 
through their economic agreements. 
 
The origin of the Pirate Party is outside parliament, and the party had a 
predecessor in the organisation “The Pirate Bureau” through which the decision 
of founding a party was taken. Through an electronic membership the party has 
managed to get a broad support and has also had the strength to carry on after an 
election that was a bit of a disappointment.  
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In its ideology the Pirate Party relies on traditional liberal freedoms of speech 
and information, very much alike The Other Russia, but also lay emphasis on 
market oriented stuff as copyrights, patent and monopoly. The ideology is a more 
or less extreme variant of liberal individualism, but where the personal freedom 
should be protected not only through market forces but through jurisdiction and 
state intervention. Here the Pirate Party rely heavily on the same kind of liberal 
individual principles as international organisations as Humans Rights Watch and 
Freedom House. 
 
The Democratic Movement (Modem) in France was founded in May 2007. In the 
presidential election 2007 Francois Bayrou, with his political roots in Christian 
democracy, presented himself as a centre-candidate. He had about 18 percent of 
the votes in the first round and was defeated. The conservative Nikolas Sarkozy 
was elected president. But after the presidential election Bayrou founded 
Mouvement Démocrate (Democratic Movement) taking his sight in the 
parliamentary elections in June 2007. In a few weeks he had around 75 000 
sympathizers through his website at http://www.bayrou.fr. In the parliamentary 
elections the party got only three mandates, including Bayrou himself. 
 
The democratic party was founded by parliamentarians, primarily Bayrou, but 
not as a party grouping in the parliament. Rather the opposite. Bayrou founded 
tha party as an opposition to the huge liberal-conservative group Union pour le 
Mouvement Populaire which consists both of the old Gaullist party and the 
liberal forces from the old Union pour la Democratie Francaise (UDF). Bayrou 
wanted to oppose the left-right cleavage in French politics and wanted to give the 
voters an alternative to conservatives and socialists.  
 
Although the parliamentary election must have been a disappointment with only 
three parliamentarians and 7,6 percent of the votes, the party goes on. Bayrou 
and the Democratic Movement are positive to European integration and have 
supported the new constitution for Europe more whole-heartedly than other 
political groupings in France. In June 2007 the party pronounced its disaffection 
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with the new accord among the EU because of all the national restrictions that 
still is at hand. But in France Modem first and foremost tries to counterbalance 
the vast majority around president Sarkozy. 
 
In his foundational speech May 24, 2007 Francois Bayrou accentuated that the 
Democratic Movement would be an ethical force in French politics. He argues 
that French citizens have lost their confidence in their representatives because of 
their misconduct in not respecting elementary regulations about financing 
elections and getting personal subsidies. He also emphasised that politics is an 
intellectual activity. In the same way as Res Publica in Estonia he argues that an 
intellectual and long-term reflection should be the usual ground for decision-
making. But where Res Publica would like to have expertise and professionals in 
specific fields, Bayrou advocates that for example artists, intellectuals, scientists 
and farmers would be invited to reflect on decision outside their own branches 
from their point of view.   
 
The principle of movement is also essential for Movement Democrate. Bayrou 
promotes politics which is not penetrated by the ideology of left and right, but 
instead by solving problems. He says that “in the field of democracy we do not 
have any enemies” and by that he admits that pragmatic solutions that could be 
accepted are better that radical ideological reforms that are implemented by 
authority. He also marks that democracy is the boundary for these solutions, and 
by this also the values associated with democracy. 
 
The Democratic Movement in France has its origin both outside and inside 
parliament, but the party has not been successful in the elections in June, 2007. 
The party has its roots in the liberal centre, but opposite the three earlier parties 
it has its roots mainly with one man, Francois Bayrou, and his political mission. 
Ideologically the party favours ethics, transparency, trust and responsibility. In 
its programme it has some resemblance with Res Publica, but is more occupied 
with balancing left and right in an old regime. Res Publica did not need to relate 
in such a way to old political democratic boundaries. 
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 Finally, there are some more examples that could have been discussed here. The 
so called “Ny Alliance” (New Alliance) in Denmark which is an 
intraparliamentary outbreak from The Radikale Venstre (right-wing liberal party) 
could be a virtue party, but it is too early to tell yet.1 Also the successful party 
“National Movement Simeon II” in Bulgaria or maybe “Forza Italia” in the 
beginning of its era could be of interest here. But I would argue that the party 
family of virtue parties should be established as such before we examine the party 




In this chapter I have discussed the emergence of a new party family called virtue 
parties. I have argues that in a globalised world a cleavage between transnational 
networks and national states has been created. Along one side of this cleavage the 
virtue parties are mobilised, along the other side the right-wing nationalist 
parties are mobilised. I have also argued that old and new democracies have 
different conditions for these parties to arise. 
 
Virtue parties I have argued promotes mainly impartiality, freedom rights, 
transparency and tries to break-up old politics. These parties opposing old party 
systems and are therefore interpreted as opposing the former cartel parties, 
discussed by Katz and Mair in 1995. Mair and Mudde have suggested that party 
families should be traced through what parties are rather than through what they 
do. In that mission they argue that origin and ideology should be the key 
elements in deciding and analysing party families. 
 
I have above suggests that the parties Res Publica in Estonia, The Other Russia in 
Russia, The Pirate Party in Sweden and The Democratic Movement in France is 
examples of virtue parties. Two of these parties have arise in old democracies 
                                                 
1 The party has changed its name to ”Liberal Alliance”. 
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(Sweden and France) and two has arise in new democracies (Estonia and Russia).  
The parties all advocates personal freedoms and build their ideology on 
universally promoted democratic rights. They also put a special emphasis on 
individualism, integrity, responsibility and ethics.  
 
The parties in the older democracies try to counter-balance the left-right-axis, 
while the parties in the newer democracies try to counter-balance the ruling 
elites. In both cases the virtue parties want to be critical alternatives and 
criticising the power structures in the state using ideological baggage from 
universal human rights. Three of the parties are founded outside the parliament 
and these three are founded out of non-established channels as discussions and 
dialogue between citizens in political clubs, organisations or forums. The fourth 
party (Democratic Movement) is founded through established channels. My 
examples are all from Europe, but nothing restrict the party family from being in 
place in other parts of the world. 
 
I would argue that it is probable that we during the first years of the new 
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